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RECENT CASES
'ORTS- 'GUEsT" STATUTE-SHARE-THE-RDE P, D, and three others entered an oral agreement to share their cars, each alternating daily in driving
his car from Yakima, where they lived, to Hanford, where they worked
carrying the other four as passengers It was further agreed that if for any
reason one party could not take his car, another party would substitute
and the missed ride would be made up There was no obligation to ride
if inconvenient P brought an action for personal injuries sustained while
D was driving his car, and D invoked Rm REv STAT SUPP (1937) §
6360-121, the Washington "guest" statute Held: P was allowed to recover
The driver was found guilty of negligence, and since he was not transporting P "without payment for such transportation" as contemplated by
the statute, the statute was no bar to recovery Coerver v Haab 123 Wn
Dec 447, 161 P (2d) 194 (1945)
The share-the-ride question has not previously come before our court
Each member contributed a share in the ride, and the difficulty is determining what constitutes 'payment" as contemplated by the statute The
payment necessary to prevent a recovery must be: (1) an actual or
potential benefit in a material or business sense resulting or to result to
the owner, and (2) transportation motivated by the expectation of such
benefit Syverson v Berg, 194 Wash 86, 77 P (2d) 382 (1938), Fuller v
Tucker, 4 Wn. (2d) 426, 103 P (2d) 1086 (1940) It is not necessary that
there be a contract in advance, or that the payment be in money, for a
paid-passenger relation to arise Scholz v Leuer, 7 Wn (2d) 76, 109 P (2d)
294 (1941) A return of favors such as paying for meals, gas, or providing
cigarettes does not necessarily destroy the relationship of host and guest
Potter v Jaurez, 189 Wash 476, 481, 66 P (2d) 290 (1937) It would seem
that a contract in advance would make it easier to find a ride motivated
by the expectation of material or business benefit though the benefit be
small Whether or not the benefit was an exchange of courtesies or a
material or business benefit is the difficult problem in these small sharecontribution cases, of which the share-the-ride situation is one In the
instant case, the court held that the share-the-ride plan was a benefit to
the driver, and had all of the elements of a contract in advance For
complete coverage of the "guest" statute problem see Comment by Professor John W Richards of the Washington Law School in (1940) 15
WASH L
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The courts in other jurisdictions, where this share-the-ride question has
arisen, seem to distinguish between a situation where several passengers
ride continuously with one driver and pay a nominal fee to cover part or
all of the expenses and a situation where several drivers rotate taking
their cars It is usually held in the former situation that the payment of
this nominal fee makes riders passengers for hire Johnson v Mack, 263
Mich 10, 248 NW 534 (1933), Miller v Fairley, 141 Ohio St 327 48 N.E
(2d) 217 (1943) Where there was a rotation of cars as in the instant case
it was held that the passenger was a guest Everett v Burg, 301 Mich
734, 4 NW (2d) 63 (1942) (a mere exchange of amenities); Fisher v
Johnson, 238 Ill App 25 (1925) (car rotation did not create relation of
Cal (2d)-,
167 P (2d)
joint enterprise); contra,Huebotterv Follett, 193(1946) (reducing cost of transportation to each was "compensation')
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CRImINAL LAw-BURGLARY-WHAT

CONSTITUTES BREAKING

113
D was con-

victed of second-degree burglary upon an information alleging that he did,
with intent to commit some crime therein, break and enter a room,
to-wit: Room 621 in the Davenport Hotel building
in the City of
Spokane
said room then and there being a place where property was
kept for use and deposit" D contends there was a failure of proof as to the
element of breaking within the meaning of the burglary statute, REM Rnv
STAT § 2579 The evidence indicated that the door was ajar only three or
four inches and that it was necessary for him to open it further to effect
his entry Held: The gist of burglarious breaking is the application of force
to remove some obstacle to entry, and the amount of force employed is not
material The application of force to push further open an already partly
open door is sufficient breaking to constitute burglary if the other essential
elements of the offense are present State v Rosencans, 124 Wash Dec 743,

167 P (2d) 170 (1946)
In so far as this case defines burglarious breaking it is a case of first
impression in the Washington court
At common law an actual breaking was required This was also the
earlier view in the American courts Corn v Steward, 7 Dane, Abr (Mass)
136 (1789) "Blackstone says that 'if a person leaves his doors and windows
open it is his own folly and negligence' Book 4, 226 This is the same as
saying that the law will not undertake to protect by its penalties a man
who is not diligent to protect himself But this is not the rule in other
branches of the criminal law
A man may recklessly and unnecessarily
pass through a group of men excited to the point of violence, but if he is
assaulted the penalty will follow A man may issue a check so carelessly
drawn as to afford an attractive opportunity for alteration, but the man
who makes the alterations will be guilty of forgery
"State v LaPoint,
87 Vt 115, 88 Ati 523 (1913)
There is a tendency on the part of a number of courts to depart from
the strict construction of the common law, which required an actual
breaking They have adopted the more reasonable and logical rule holding
that but the slightest force is necessary to constitute a breaking Goins v

State, 90 Ohio St 176, L R A 1915 D, 241, 107 N E 335 (1914); State v
Sore-son, 157 Iowa 534, 138 N W 411 (1912) In the Goins case, pushing
open a door partly open was held to constitute "forcible breaking" within
the terms of the Ohio statute The Washington statute requires only
"breaking"
Hence the Washington court, in the first time that the question has
been presented to it, has indicated that it has departed from the common
law rule and the earlier American rule
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